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Capital punishment was the pinnacle of the colonial judicial system and its use of
state violence, but has previously been neglected as a topic of historical research
in Africa. This article is based on the case files and legal records of over 800
capital trials  predominantly for murder  dating between 1900 and 1947. It
outlines the functioning of the legal system in Nyasaland and the tensions
between ‘‘violence’’ and ‘‘humanitarianism’’ in the use and reform of the death
penalty. Capital punishment was a political penalty as much as a judicial
punishment, with both didactic and deterrent functions: it operated through
mercy and the sparing of condemned lives as well as through executions. Mercy in
Nyasaland was consistent with colonial political objectives and cultural values: it
was decided not only on the facts of cases, but according to British conceptions of
‘‘justice’’, ‘‘order’’, ‘‘criminality’’, and ‘‘African’’ behaviour. This article analyses
the use of mercy in Nyasaland to provide a lens on the nature of colonial
governance, and the tensions between African and colonial understandings of
violence.
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the fact that the man is an ignorant Mang’anja cannot be considered as tending to
mitigate the crime of which he has been found guilty; although he is an ignorant,
degenerate native he is perfectly aware of the seriousness of his act, which was one of
sheer brutality and merits the extreme penalty of Law.1
Murder, among themselves, is fairly common, usually about women and committed
under the influence of drink, but I do not remember trying a case where even admitting
the facts alleged against him, there was not a good deal to be said for the culprit.2
Capital punishment is the ultimate judicial assertion of sovereign authority and
power. Most scholarship focuses on the death penalty as a mechanism of social
control or seeks to explain its evolution through discourses of ‘‘civilization’’.3 This
article, however, investigates capital punishment as a political  rather than simply
penal  measure, using the death penalty as a lens through which to shed light on the
nature of colonial rule as well as on tensions within African society.4 Notions of
punishment in Africa were intimately linked to concepts of ‘‘civilization’’, ‘‘justice’’
and ‘‘good governance’’ in the colonial period, but also to the necessity of violence in
sustaining European rule. Nowhere was the symbolic relationship between the
‘‘primitive savagery’’ that colonialism claimed to supplant and the resemblance its
corporeal technologies bore to that savagery more evident than in the use of the
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death penalty.5 Despite the emergence of a rich historiography on crime and
punishment in Africa, there has been surprisingly little research on this apogee of the
colonial legal system.6 Moreover, with the exception of Chanock’s seminal Law,
Custom and Social Order, Nyasaland itself has been overlooked in much of the
existing literature.7 And yet the colonial archives in Zomba offer a wealth of detail on
both the operation of colonial law and punishment in the territory, and the social
tensions highlighted by criminal activity and its prosecution. The focus here is not on
the terminal violence of the executions which occurred under British rule, but rather
on the legal and political processes which led an accused murderer to the gallows,
and the manner in which the Royal Prerogative of Mercy was used to moderate the
violence of capital punishment in shaping a form of ‘‘justice’’ which could uphold
British authority.8
Criminal law defined the African as an individual with inalienable rights, but also
as subject to the disciplinary apparatus of the state.9 Although colonial states tended
to think of African subjects within tribal collectivities and stereotypes, legal
proceedings before the courts individualized the African accused. Criminal records
can reveal how colonial categories of knowledge  in this case usually the ‘‘African
murderer’’  constituted colonized people as an object of study and control in the
service of state power.10 The high level of evidence required for conviction on a
capital charge meant that the colonial state often knew more about suspected
murderers than about almost any other colonial subject. The value of criminal
records for history is not so much what they uncover about a particular crime, about
‘‘guilt’’ or ‘‘innocence’’, as what they reveal about the practice of state power and
otherwise invisible or opaque aspects of human experience, particularly in Africa
where scholars’ knowledge of communities’ daily lives is often sparse.11 A reliance on
judicial records, however, creates a number of methodological concerns for the
historian. As with all crimes, such texts only record cases that were reported to the
authorities and successfully brought to court. With murder cases representing an
exceptional form of violence and the surviving archival records being of variable
quality, murder trial narratives cannot give us a comprehensive view of manifesta-
tions of violence within African communities, their general treatment in courts, nor
even of colonial penal violence itself. Extant records suggest, however, that accused
murderers interacted with the colonial legal arena as both individuals and
stereotypes, shaping their narratives to suit and exploit colonial (mis-)understand-
ings of ‘‘truth’’, ‘‘criminality’’ and ‘‘African’’ cultures. Both truths and lies inevitably
shaped the final outcomes of the murder trials discussed below, alongside what Stoler
terms ‘‘the hierarchies of credibility’’ through which colonial courts evaluated
testimonies from various African and European witnesses: hierarchies formed along
lines of race, gender, ethnicity, class and religion.12
Violence in the colonies was constitutive of difference, but it was also limited by the
contradictory nature of colonial governance and its need for legitimation.13 In
studying the death penalty, we need to seek the limits of its violence  its legal
boundaries and sentencing outcomes  as much as its terminal force. The article
will begin with a brief introduction to the legal and administrative procedures of
capital punishment in Nyasaland between 1908 and 1947, before outlining the general
trends of murder trials and capital convictions. Although, as Chanock has written,
‘‘law was the cutting edge of colonialism’’, sometimes a colonial state chose to blunt
Justice’s sword and spare the lives of subjects it had sentenced to death.14 The Royal
Prerogative of Mercy allowed the Governor of a colony to reprieve a capital conviction
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and moderate the rigour of the law to suit colonial societies and modes of
governance.15 This article looks at the reasons behind these decisions in order to
illuminate the attitudes of colonial states towards their recalcitrant subjects and the
crimes of murder they committed, but also to highlight the competing legal, political,
administrative and cultural imperatives which shaped colonialism in Nyasaland.
The path to the gallows: murder and the colonial courts
As elsewhere in British colonial Africa, the law relating to murder in Nyasaland was
based on English common law; the death penalty was a mandatory sentence for
crimes of treason and murder, and a discretionary sentence in rape cases, although in
the latter it served as symbolic legislation and was seemingly never implemented.16
Aside from the treason convictions during the Chilembwe Uprising of 1915, capital
trials were almost exclusively held for the offence of murder. To contextualize the
extent of the death penalty’s usage, in the period between 1903 and 1947 there are
some 897 extant capital trials in the Zomba archives.17 The quality of these records is
variable: whilst some cases are recorded in extensive detail, others contain little more
than a name and date of trial. Even where the prosecution was successful and the
record is more substantive, it would appear that judges in many cases were unable to
determine the exact circumstances and motives behind murders. Some tentative
conclusions can be reached, however, from the available evidence. The majority of
murders in Nyasaland were regarded as being a result of domestic quarrels between
spouses or families.18 Almost 25% of capital convictions were designated as spousal
murders. Eighty-one of 456 murders with ascribed motives involved beer drinks or
drunkenness. Other significant motive factors included fights, assassination, sudden
affray, insanity, sexually motivated murder, robbery or theft and the killing of
suspected witches. The vast majority of accused were male, with only 27 cases
definitely involving female offenders.
Prosecuting these cases was often a protracted affair, with cases moving from
police investigations to preliminary enquiries before finally arriving to full trial in
assize courts held across the territory. Despite its importance in the operation of
colonial rule, justice in Nyasaland was a skeleton operation and was openly
acknowledged to be imperfect.19 The legal system in Nyasaland was administrative
and political, rather than professionally ‘‘legal,’’ for much of the period, a fact
underscored by the wide divergences between colonial legal practices and the
ideological model of British law: before 1930s the accused was likely to have no
defence counsel; once at court, cases could be tried in a matter of hours; laws of
evidence and procedure were frequently misinterpreted or disregarded; and multiple
languages and world-views clashed to obscure trial narratives and testimonies.20 A
lack of qualified legal staff meant that before 1936 Nyasaland was forced to empower
District Magistrates rather than professional judges to try some capital cases in the
first instance, with such sentences then sent for review in the High Court.21 This use
of administrative officers as magistrates tended to favour ‘‘substantive’’ or
‘‘administrative justice’’ over ‘‘due process’’ and the strict application of the law,
creating tensions between legal and administrative departments as well as between
African opinion and European officials over the practice of ‘‘justice’’.22
Whilst more research is needed into pre-colonial attitudes towards murder and its
punishment in Nyasaland, colonial ethnography and post-colonial memory suggest
that physical ‘‘chastisement’’ was seldom inflicted, except among the Angoni where a
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range of ‘‘treasonable’’ offences against chiefs could result in an individuals’ death.23
Chewa communities were reported to punish murder through the payment of nkuku
(admission of guilt) and lipo (compensation), the lipo being heaviest where kucita
dala (intention) was admitted. The death sentence was available for serious or repeat
offenders, but was generally carried out only where the offender refused to reveal the
reasons behind his actions or where his family refused to pay lipo. A death sentence
was carried out through spear thrust, burning, drowning or secate´ra (impalement),
and was enforced on chief ’s orders rather than by family members, except in ufitwe
(witchcraft) cases.24 The fact that under colonialism some crimes previously regarded
as befitting death  such as adultery, theft and witchcraft  were no longer capital
offences, whilst others that had been accepted as legitimate mechanisms of social
defence  such as the killing of suspected witches  now resulted in a capital sentence,
created significant tensions. Most judges were aware of these tensions between
English and ‘‘customary’’ law and many felt that ‘‘Native custom and mentality . . .
should be considered so far as circumstances permit so long as legal principles
applied at home are not seriously affected in their application to the Protectorate’’.25
The courts which tried capital cases were not monolithic blocks but sites of
contestation where values and beliefs were both expressed and shaped.26 In an
attempt to mediate such tensions, judges were assisted in court by Native Assessors,
often European missionaries or settlers in the early days of colonisation but by the
1920s usually Provincial or Village Headmen, who were to advise on points of native
law and custom.27 Opinion was divided among judges as to the usefulness of African
assessors. Whilst some argued that assessors opinions were of the utmost importance
in understanding circumstances and motivations behind the crime, another found
that:
I do not think that there are two headmen in this district with intelligence enough to
give an opinion of any weight; their presence is beneficial only in as much as a convicted
native, pleading not guilty, understands that he is not convicted by the European alone,
on interpreted evidence, but that his own people judge him as well.28
After sentencing, the convicted man had the right to appeal, with recourse lying
from the District Courts to the High Court, from there to the East African Court of
Appeal, and in extremis to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. It
was not until the 1920s that appeals became commonplace.29 If an appeal failed, the
final chance for a condemned prisoner to escape the gallows lay in the Royal
Prerogative of Mercy, exercised in the colonies by the Governor, who was advised by
his judges and Executive Council.30 The Governor had the power to confirm
sentence and order an execution, commute the sentence to imprisonment, or pardon
the condemned man.31 This authority made the death penalty fundamentally
different from other forms of punishment, in that it was an expressly politicized
penalty. Ultimately, this made capital punishment an instrument of state politics, as
much as, if not more than, a penal policy.32 An analysis of the final disposition of
these capital cases, taken from the available trial records, reveals that the period
190347 witnessed a general decline in the rates of execution accompanied by a
marked increase in manslaughter pleas and convictions, the latter being a direct
result of the widespread introduction of defence attorneys and pleaders from the
mid-1930s.33 Of 897 recorded outcomes in murder trials, 181 executions were
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ordered, and 97 sentences were commuted to life imprisonment, with a further 100
commuted to lesser prison sentences.34
The power of life and death: the principles of mercy
There have been a number of competing interpretations of the functioning of mercy
in English and colonial criminal justice systems. The eminent criminologists Leon
Radinowicz and Roger Hood argued that mercy decisions in England were made on
the basis of the law, with murders involving deliberation and planning resulting in
execution.35 For Victorian England, Roger Chadwick maintains instead that it was
the social and moral meanings of murder that were key to allocating mercy, whilst for
Canada Carolyn Strange has proposed that mercy was at base arbitrary.36 Within
Africa, Robert Turrell has stressed the importance of political cultures in shaping
South Africa’s shifting patterns of mercy.37 Most influentially, Douglas Hay argued
in his classic appraisal of criminal law in eighteenth-century England that mercy was
a discretionary instrument whose exercise confirmed the mental structures of
paternalism and deference to uphold the social order, allowing criminal courts to
function as ‘‘a selective instrument of class justice’’.38 Whilst mercy in Nyasaland was
similarly influential in upholding social hierarchies and supporting the self-
representation of colonial paternalism, it also functioned as a selective instrument
of a racialized colonial justice: the bureaucratic calculus of its decisions was shaped
by shifting landscapes of power and stereotyped conceptions of African behaviour.39
Although Governors were not legally required to state the reasons behind their
decisions, it was rare for them to go against advice from their judges; the rationale
behind mercy decisions can thus be inferred from the details of case records, judge’s
recommendations, and the confidential reports prepared by District Officers on the
background to a case.40 From this evidence, mercy in Nyasaland can be theorized as
operating on three different levels: as an arbitrary modulation of judicial severity; as
the implementation of established metropolitan principles; and, finally, as an
expression of the politics of colonial rule.
At its most basic level, the operation of mercy was essentially arbitrary.
Translated from principle to practice, as mercy was decided on a case-by-case basis,
capital punishment inevitably took on a degree of arbitrariness that made the fate of
the individual capital offender a matter of circumstance as much as law: whether a
man lived or died could, quite literally, depend upon a Governor’s personal reaction
to the case placed before him.41 In 1935 the case of Amos alias Fewst Eber was
brought before Governor Kittermaster. Amos had killed his two children by another
woman after being taken to court for adultery by his wife. Child-killing was normally
severely punished but although no signs of insanity were found after six months of
medical observation and the judge made no recommendation to mercy, Kittermaster
decided to commute Amos’ sentence.42 Yet whilst arbitrary decisions can account for
some of the commutations granted by Governors in Nyasaland, it is inconsistent
with what we know about the operation of colonial governance to argue that there
were no rational or calculated motivations behind the reprieves granted.
At another level then, mercy was decided according to established principles:
categories of murder befitting of commutation or execution which had emerged in
Britain before being transplanted into Africa and adapted for use.43 Indeed,
Nyasaland conducted a survey of mercy in 1924 specifically to confirm that
sentencing was operating in line with these British principles.44 There were a number
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of categories of murder held as demanding the ‘‘extreme penalty of the law’’. The
primary justification given for the use of capital punishment was one of deterrence.
It was thus those crimes most threatening to the colonial order, at a village or
national level, that were most severely punished. The Chilembwe Uprising in
JanuaryFebruary 1915, led by the Baptist preacher John Chilembwe, provides the
strongest example of this use of the death penalty to re-establish colonial authority.
Chilembwe’s rebellion shocked British officials and settlers; his men launched attacks
on settler plantations in Magomero, killing three European men whilst allowing the
women and children to live. The rebellion failed (as Chilembwe’s call to his followers
to ‘‘strike a blow and die’’ suggested he believed it would) because it lacked wide
support from the local population and because the state responded quickly and
brutally to the threat, with military, police and settler volunteer forces hunting down
and killing suspected rebels.45 The impression from the archive is of a colonial state
scrambling to regain control, and deploying exceptional levels and forms of violence
to achieve this. As Governor Smith later wrote, ‘‘the lesson learnt had necessarily to
be a harsh one’’, and perhaps 50 of Chilembwe’s followers were killed in battle, 300
others given prison sentences and a collective fine imposed on the area.46 As part of
this repression a series of hastily convened courts passed a death sentence on 46 men
for the offences of murder and high treason. Thirty-six were executed, with the ring-
leaders hanged in public along the main Mlanje-Mikalongwe road near the
Magomero Estate where the Europeans had been killed, in an effort to increase
the deterrent message of the sentence.47 The very exceptionality of penal excess in
this case, rather than abrogating the rule of law which the British considered integral
to their colonial legitimacy, in fact served to re-establish its boundaries.48
In peace time, those convicts most likely to face the gallows were ‘‘those who
commit cold-blooded and premeditated murder, or those who accompany robbery
with murder’’.49 As Radzinowicz and Hood argue for twentieth-century England, the
primary legal basis for determining mercy was the element of premeditation involved
in a murder, but judges in Nyasaland believed that many murders there were
unpremeditated.50 Murders which directly challenged colonial authorities and social
hierarchies, such as inter-racial murders and attacks on chiefs or policemen, were
rare in Nyasaland but were punished severely when they did occur. In his memoirs,
former judge Charles Belcher recalled discussing with Executive Council members in
the mid-1920s the case of a young African man accused of murdering an Indian
trader. Fearing protests from the Indian community if the condemned man’s sentence
was commuted, some Executive Council members argued that ‘‘After all, Nyasaland
natives are plentiful and not very vocal. One [argued] ‘I do not think that it would
hurt to hang a few of them’. And, no doubt, on a very broad view, it would not.’’
Contrary to Belcher’s advice, ‘‘the native was hanged, and Indian resentment at any
possible commutation was thus obviated’’, demonstrating the importance of
maintaining social and racial hierarchies in the disposition of capital cases.51
Murders committed for pecuniary motives, such as those committed in the act of
robbery or by hired assassins, were particularly likely to result in execution,
indicating the role of the law in defending property as well as person.52 The severe
treatment of pecuniary murders was in line with African attitudes towards such
crimes; Elijah Nyirongo was executed in 1951 for a murder committed to gain money
to repay debts after the District Officer at Mzimba reported that ‘‘local opinion
considers this the worst crime ever committed in the Northern Province under
European rule’’.53 The type of weapon used could also affect a person’s chances of
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being executed. As a person was assumed to intend the probable consequences of
their acts, assaults with a lethal weapon like a gun, axe, or spear were presumed to
convey malice and treated severely.54
On the other hand, there were recognised categories of murderers who were
frequently regarded as befitting of mercy, categories established following British
precedent, but adapted to fit colonial conceptions of African behaviour and
psychology. As in Britain, certain categories of convicted murderer were automatically
spared the death penalty under statute: youths under the age of 18 and pregnant
women.55 In a break from metropolitan precedent, however, women were very rarely
executed: 16 women were convicted of murder during this period, but only one Aiba 
was executed (in 1926) for participation in the cannibalistic murder of a young girl, a
practice deemed particularly ‘‘repugnant’’ by British courts.56 Violent female
offenders usually escaped the gallows through a combination of a colonial ‘‘chivalry
of mercy’’ and a cultural reluctance to inflict violence publicly on female subjects,
alongside the belief of many judges that ‘‘the mind of the female native is insufficiently
developed to justify the application of the extreme penalty of the law’’.57 Youths over
the age of 18 often avoided the gallows because they were assumed to be acting under
the influence of older men, a fact indicative of the emphasis placed by colonial
administrators on generational difference and discipline in discourses on African
socialization (and this despite contemporary complaints by many elders about
rebellious youths who were no longer recognizing their authority).58 Elderly convicts
were routinely spared the gallows, less due to respect for their age than because even a
relatively short sentence of imprisonment would see them die in prison.59 Doubt as to
the actual circumstances of a case was another significant factor in the granting of
mercy, particularly where there were discrepancies between ‘‘known’’ and legally
‘‘admissible’’ evidence in a trial.60 It would seem from the evidence that Nyasaland’s
judges were not ‘‘hanging judges’’, regarding capital punishment as a necessary but
distasteful tool in enforcing law and order. In their minds, the death penalty was a
British imposition, which required adaptation and moderation through mercy to
function effectively and ‘‘humanely’’ in an African environment. Sufficient numbers of
sentences were being commuted in the post-Chilembwe years that by 1922 a
Punishment of Murder (Natives) Ordinance was proposed to create a discretionary
rather than mandatory death penalty for African offenders. Although the Colonial
Office rejected the proposal, Chief Justice Jackson maintained that the mandatory
penalty was inhumane and inefficient for all involved.61
Women, witches and beer: social and moral meanings of murder
Other categories of mercy were more culturally contingent and fluid, with the
outcome depending upon the interpretation of the specifics of the case set against
shifting conceptions of problematic African social behaviour. These included cases of
intoxication, domestic violence, suspected insanity, and witchcraft. Alcohol con-
sumption was a major contributing factor in many murders. Officials had long noted
that ‘‘beer and women’’ were the main causes of violent crime in colonial Africa.62
Beer drinks were central to communal life across many parts of Nyasaland and were
a frequent site of quarrels, many of which turned violent and could result in murder.
With the development of kachaso- (local gin) and beer-brewing in urban areas from
the 1920s, colonial awareness of the problem increased dramatically.63 By 1947 the
Annual Judicial Report stated that ‘‘It is clear that attendance at beer drinks is the
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cause of the majority of the crimes of violence committed’’, with alcohol involved in
43 of 79 reported murders.64 In sentencing such cases, judges and officials were torn
between the desire to inflict punishment to deter future cases and the knowledge that
such measures would undoubtedly fail. Mercy was usually accorded only where the
accused was judged sufficiently intoxicated to compromise their ability to resist
provocation.65
As outlined above, domestic murders  particularly spousal killings  were a
common category of murder in colonial courts. This highlights the severity of gender
tensions in Nyasaland societies during this period, which resulted from factors
including labour migration, urbanization and the impact of Christian cultures.66 The
vast majority of cases involved husbands attacking wives. Marital difficulties which
escalated into murder ranged from a wife refusing to cook for her husband, spending
his money and calling him names to more serious disagreements over issues such as
bridewealth, adultery, desertion and disputed sexual access to the wife.67 In the 1910
case of Majawa  in which the accused cut his wife’s throat because, he claimed, she
had been guilty of constant nagging, hiding his things and throwing their child into
the fire during a quarrel  Native Assessor Syasya recorded that:
Before the white men came here the women were afraid to behave ill to their husbands,
they would have been punished at first and her witnesses to marriage would be made to
pay, and they would most certainly have been killed had they committed adultery . . .
Majawa has killed his wife and if he is killed it is as the law is now, but we chiefs do not
think that he deserves to be put to death. Many women are giving trouble because they
no longer fear their husbands. If Majawa is killed it will have a bad effect on all our
women who are often troublesome now. We think that from our point of view Majawa
should be released, but we do not think that this will be done.68
In the end, Majawa was given a life sentence, to be reconsidered after five years. The
colonial period saw a broad evolution in judges’ attitudes to spousal killers, which
seems to have altered in tandem with wider concerns about gender relations,
marriage and adultery in African communities, developments in ‘‘customary law’’,
and the bargains of collaboration between colonial officials and Native Authorities.69
In the early days of colonization many men who killed their wives were sent to the
gallows in an attempt to enforce British conceptions of morality, but by the 1920s, as
fears of detribalization increased, colonial judges seem to have become more
sympathetic towards African patriarchs’ concerns about disobedient women, and
many convicted wife-murderers had sentences commuted, before attitudes again
hardened against spousal murders in the late 193040s.70
Whilst domestic murders often had clear attributable motives, many other cases
brought before the courts were more opaque in their rationales. Trial narratives
frequently drew links between violence and mental instability or insanity to explain
otherwise apparently motiveless murders, particularly those which displayed high
levels of unrestrained violence.71 The law applicable to criminal insanity in Africa
was the same as in England: the M’Naghten rules, which declared a person ‘‘not
criminally responsible for an act if at the time of committing it he is, through any
disease affecting his mind, incapable of understanding what he is doing, or of
knowing that he ought not to do the act’’.72 Colonial rule was predicated upon the
supposed difference between the ‘‘European’’ and ‘‘African’’ mind, and the European
official’s power to define and defend this alleged difference.73 However, establishing
the state of mind of a murderer at the time of the crime was a difficult prospect in
Journal of Eastern African Studies 549
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
xe
ter
] a
t 0
7:5
7 0
8 M
ay
 20
13
 
Africa, where psychiatric facilities were limited and understanding of the ‘‘African
mind’’ was openly acknowledged to be incomplete. Moreover, conceptions of what
constituted socially abnormal or ‘‘insane’’ behaviour differed between African and
European perspectives.74 The high numbers of Africans who were gathered into the
medical system after trial in colonial courts led to extensive theorizing about the
connection between mental illness and violence in African communities from both
legal and medical perspectives.75 The Zomba alienists Shelley and Roberts certainly
believed that ‘‘the nearer one descends to the state of primitive man, the more keen is
the desire to kill’’.76 Africans were seen by judges as being particularly prone to
mental instability: ‘‘a form of mental chaos very much more common with Africans
than with Europeans causing them on very little provocation to commit acts of
violence, attempt suicide or run amuck’’.77 Temporary fits of insanity were
frequently attributed to Africans convicted of murder, particularly when excited by
intense emotion, alcohol or sexual passion. Acting Attorney-General Martin stated
in 1934 that ‘‘it is generally recognised that natives frequently lose their heads when
excited sexually’’.78 Particular ethnic groups were also viewed as having collective
propensities towards mental weakness. In the case of Kapopo, a policeman convicted
of murdering his wife, it was noted ‘‘that the Awemba tribe to which Kapopo belongs
are notoriously apt to become unbalanced under strong emotional influences  so
much so that they are no longer recruited for the Nyasaland Police’’.79 Both judges
and doctors felt there was a blurred boundary between insanity and low
intelligence.80 Much of the behaviour attributed to or claimed by Africans during
murder trials, however, could not be easily classified as ‘‘criminal insanity’’ under the
M’Naghten rules: ‘‘one of those temporary fits of mental derangement, which for a
want of a better terms are commonly called running amok’’, or ‘‘something having
all the effects of insanity though falling without the legal definition of that mental
state’’.81 The medicalization of penal discourse was only partial across Africa for
much of the colonial period; judges tended to use medical opinion to support their
rulings rather than determine them, privileging their localized knowledge over the
more universalistic, scientific knowledge of medical discourse.82 This contest for
dominant knowledge on the African mind reflects the wider conflicts within the
colonial state, particularly between the increasingly professional judicial service and
the colonial administration, over the best method of ordering the African
population.83
If colonial courts had difficulty in interpreting the rationality of murder in an
African cultural context, the treatment of insanity was further complicated by the
prevalence of witchcraft beliefs as motives for lethal attacks.84 The problem for the
courts was to how to determine between the ‘‘mad’’, the ‘‘bad’’, and those who
thought themselves bewitched. The 1911 Witchcraft Ordinance established that
deaths directly resulting from witchcraft practices (such as mbauvi poison ordeals)
were to be tried under its regulations, rather than under murder statutes, and were
consequently not liable for capital sentencing. However, many murder cases in Africa
resulted from the killing of suspected witches by individuals or communities who felt
threatened by a witch’s powers. Colonial law summarily dismissed a witch’s claims to
supernatural powers, but was still forced to take into account the numerous
occasions on which magic provided a powerful motive for criminal action.85 Such
cases were problematic not only because the killing of suspected witches was
‘‘repugnant to justice or morality’’, but because they challenged the monopoly of
force on which colonial rule rested. Under English common law, as applied in
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Nyasaland’s Penal Code, witchcraft was not a ‘‘reasonable belief ’’ and so the killing
of a suspected witch could not be held as self-defence.86 In cases where persons were
convicted of such a murder, however, the death sentence would almost invariably be
commuted, as ‘‘education’’ not ‘‘execution’’ was widely regarded throughout the
period as the only effective method of eradicating the belief in witchcraft.87 Some
courts displayed considerable sympathy towards Africans reacting against perceived
witchcraft, portraying them as victims of superstition rather than violent criminals.88
Loid and Liason Kwilambo were two brothers convicted in 1945 of murdering two of
their uncles, whom they suspected of having bewitched and killed their nephew
Kusweje. The murders took place in broad daylight, and in front of witnesses, in
Cholo. District Magistrate MacDonald, giving testimony about the crime, stated that
it was ‘‘Undoubtedly a deliberate and unpremeditated crime, executed with an
unusual degree of barbarity. Yet [it was not] not actuated by love of gain, or lust, or
selfish revenge, or by any other sordid motive, but by the superstitious fears and out
of pity for relations believed to have been bewitched and killed’’, and the brothers’
sentences were commuted.89
Cultural defences: ‘‘African’’ behaviour and the state of a society
Perhaps the most influential scholar on modern studies of capital punishment has
been Michel Foucault.90 Moving beyond Discipline and Punish, in his later writings
and lectures Foucault accorded capital punishment a brief, yet strategically
significant, role in the genealogy of bio-power, arguing that capital punishment
was an active tool of power, marking the changing political contours of life.91 In
modern states, he argues that ‘‘capital punishment could not be maintained except by
invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the criminal, his
incorrigibility, and the safeguard of society. One has the right to kill those who
represented a biological danger to others.’’ This scientific and moral demarcation of
‘‘monstrosity’’ was mediated primarily through racism, Foucault taking race as a
means of division rather than a biological substratum.92 Following this argument,
the establishment and dehumanization of the African murderer as a monstrous
biological and criminal ‘‘Other’’ should facilitate the use of the death penalty.
Certainly there are numerous examples of racialized and ‘‘dehumanizing’’ stereotypes
being employed in trial narratives and judgements to highlight the ‘‘monstrosity’’ of
the criminal, as with the ‘‘ignorant, degenerate native’’ Nsuera, mentioned at the
outset of this article, who was executed for the murder of his wife.93 The idiom of
‘‘brutality’’ was frequently invoked in calling for execution, linking the violence of
the crimes with a bestial atrocity redolent of contemporary tropes of African
animalistic savagery.94 However, colonial penal and judicial discourse reflected a
more conflicted view of the African murderer than a broadly Foucauldian narrative
alone would suggest.
At a further level of analysis, mercy was shaped by the political and cultural
landscapes of colonialism.95 To the minds of many colonial officials across Eastern
Africa, murderers were in fact the most ‘‘manly’’ and honest of African criminals,
particularly when compared to recidivists and thieves: as Belcher noted, ‘‘I do not
remember trying a case where, even admitting the facts alleged against him, there was
not a good deal to be said for the culprit’’.96 In Nyasaland, many African murderers
were seen as acting according to tribal custom or natural ‘‘warrior-instinct’’, a
sentiment which was particularly prevalent during the 1910s and 1920s. It can be
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suggested that the form and rhetoric of juridical-bureaucratic language, alongside
the presence of African crowds at trials, prevented resort to extreme dehumanizing
tropes in explaining and prosecuting murders. Crucially, the very tropes of ‘‘primitive
mentality’’ and ‘‘savagery’’ that could dehumanize an accused African and subject
him to the death sentence were also appropriated and repackaged in defence
narratives in order to deny full criminal responsibility or mens rea for his actions and
to facilitate commutation where the crime fell within established categories of
potential mercy.97 An elderly man, Bokosi, on trial in 1932 for the murder of his
young wife was convicted only of manslaughter after Judge Harragin found ‘‘no
doubt being of the older generation, [the accused] still has a modicum of the old
unrestrained spirit of the savage’’.98 Judges’ reports are replete with assertions that
Africans lacked the self-control and discipline of the ‘‘civilised European’’ and were
more prone to violent acts, either through provocation or ‘‘irresistible impulse’’.99
Such typologies were expressly used to justify mercy by judges and defence counsels
alike: in the case of Chigwenemba, convicted in 1924 of murdering a man during a
fight at a beer drink, Acting Judge Charles Belcher asserted ‘‘the primitive nature of
the native mind and the ease with which it is inflamed by drink and also by sexual
passion should call where those considerations arise for different treatment from that
which an European in like circumstances should receive’’.100 Particularly in the 1920s
and 1930s, successful cultural defence narratives for Africans on trial depended upon
portraying them as ‘‘primitives’’ who could not fairly be judged by the norms of
‘‘civilised’’ white men. Belcher notably believed that ‘‘Allowances must be made for
the tendency of the native to react violently to trifling provocation,’’ and judges
agreed that the majority of murders were results of ‘‘crimes of passion’’ or
unpremeditated actions.101 In fact, this represented a fundamental contradiction in
the use of capital punishment in Nyasaland and across British colonial Africa: if the
majority of murders were unpremeditated, as colonial officials believed, how could
capital punishment act as an effective deterrent?102 Cultural defence narratives
successfully inspired mercy for individual Africans, whilst simultaneously reinforcing
discriminatory hegemonic social relations and ideas of race.103 Interestingly,
educated Christian or ‘‘Europeanized’’ natives were less likely to be judged befitting
of mercy than their ‘‘primitive’’ counterparts. In the case of Julius, convicted of the
murder of his wife Malita in Port Herald Nyasaland in 1946, it was stated: ‘‘As a
Christian teacher, Julius presumably takes a greater responsibility for his actions than
do his less enlightened brothers for theirs. Consequently he can have less recourse to
the clemency of His Excellency the Governor.’’104 The higher an African climbed up
the evolutionary ladder, the more dangerous he became in colonial eyes, and the
more subject to violence should he fail to adhere to colonial expectations.
Mercy decisions were also explicitly related to the general level of law and order
in a locality, and to a community’s perceived standing on the ‘‘ladder of civilization’’.
Once order had been restored after the Chilembwe Uprising, the colonial state faced
few serious threats to its authority, allowing a generally high level of mercy. Colonial
authority did have to be constantly maintained and extended, however. In 1925
District Officer Nichols of Fort Johnston successfully called for the execution of two
men, Sikumbuli and Bonomali, arguing that ‘‘The crime was a brutal one and was
committed in a section of the District which is inclined to be unruly. On that account
I consider it necessary to make an example of the chief offender.’’105 Regarding the
case of an Agomba man who deliberately killed his wife after suspecting she was
committing adultery with her former husband, Judge Johnson wrote to Governor
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Kittermaster: ‘‘Whether the sentence shall be carried out will doubtless be considered
by Your Excellency in Council in relation to the development of the particular
tribe.’’106 When a case went to the Governor-in-Council for final disposition, the
District Officer from the condemned’s home area was required to draft a ‘‘mercy
report’’ to aid deliberation. This report aimed to gather local background
information about the crime, including a personal history of the prisoner and details
of any mitigating factors or ‘‘native customs’’ that might have shaped the
condemned’s actions.107 The records of these reports from Lilongwe and Dodoma
districts in the 1940s and 1950s reveal that there was considerable support for capital
punishment among the African population for murders they viewed as serious,
although it is questionable both whether such communities were telling the District
Officer what they thought he wanted to hear and whether these are representative
samples. Whether those interviewed spoke well of their fellow villager or denounced
him as a troublesome member of society could strongly influence a mercy decision.
Chikwenka villagers, supporting the execution of one man, Kachinga, in 1945, reveal
an important consideration in their support for capital punishment: ‘‘They admit he
has shown no previous tendency to murder or assault and that they cannot see any
motive for the crime, but they hold by the central fact that in spite of his previous
good character he is no longer to be trusted as a member of the community.’’108 It
was those regarded as a danger to the stability and security of the community whose
deaths would be called for. District Officer Wickham, reporting on the case of
Mangulenji convicted of murdering his wife in Kota Kota, stated that local opinion
believed:
For what he has done he thoroughly deserves to pay the penalty of death. Everyone is
glad to know that the death sentence has been passed on him, and that he will therefore
pay that penalty. They go so far as to say that had the case come before their Court he
would already have paid.109
Conclusion
As colonial states and penal systems developed their networks of power to become
less arbitrary and more routinized, a specifically colonial economy of penal violence
emerged to fulfil the competing objectives of self-contradictory colonial govern-
mentality.110 The legal-administrative nexus in Nyasaland closely linked the
operation of justice with the maintenance of order and the defence of the colonial
state and society, and it was those cases deemed most threatening to the colonial
order which resulted in judicial execution. Whilst political instability often shaped
patterns of commutation, particularly in the context of anti-colonial struggles like
the Chilembwe Uprising, the archives reveal what contemporaries recognized 
mercy was both arbitrary and predictable.111 Judges and District Magistrates in
Nyasaland tended not to be ‘‘hanging judges’’. Most saw the necessity of adapting
the law to fit local circumstances and to reconcile it to their understandings of
‘‘native custom’’.112 Broadly speaking, many avoided death sentences or recom-
mending executions where possible, although it is difficult to determine how far this
reluctance to apply the extreme penalty of the law was a result of an opposition to
capital punishment itself, or of paternalism towards the African accused. Overall in
Nyasaland, the use of the death penalty was determined by the particular character
of colonial justice and the ideological landscape of colonial governance. Social and
political appraisals of murder proved crucial to the disposition, alongside legal
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definitions and arbitrary decisions. Racialized stereotypes of ‘‘primitive’’ African
mentalities and ‘‘customary’’ justifications for violence suffused the operation of
criminal justice, but in many murder trials such collectivising and dehumanizing
tropes formed ‘‘cultural defence’’ narratives crucial to securing commutations. The
flexibility in sentencing facilitated by mercy helped fill the chasm between
‘‘customary’’ and colonial attitudes to murder, ultimately helping to uphold British
authority whilst allowing the larger structural injustices of the colonial judicial
regime to remain unaddressed.113
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